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Certification Statutes: Engineering a Solution to
Pullman Abstention Delay
When a litigant in federal court challenges a state action as be-
ing contrary to the federal Constitution, the federal court will avoid
reaching those constitutional issues if some other means of disposing
of the case is available.' If the challenged state action is invalid
under applicable state law, the federal court will dispose of the case
on state law grounds and refrain from deciding the federal question. 2
When the state law is unclear, however, the determination of
whether the challenged state action violates state law is difficult for
the federal court to make.
The Pullman abstention doctrine, formulated in Railroad Commis-
sion of Texas v. Pullman Co. ,3 attempts to resolve this problem by al-
lowing federal courts to abstain from deciding such cases until the
parties have had an opportunity to obtain a state court decision on
the state issues involved.4 In this way, the state court decides the
state issues and the federal court avoids deciding a federal constitu-
tional question prematurely or unnecessarily. For if the state court
should hold the state action invalid as a matter of state law, there
would be no need for the federal court to pass on the federal constitu-
tional question.5
Two policy concerns underlie the Pullman abstention doctrine.
1 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
2 Id This is commonly known as the Siler doctrine, derived from Siler v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). In Siler, the Court held that the interest of avoiding unnecessary
constitutional adjudication requires that the federal court turn first to issues of state law:
Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising
under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think it much better to decide it
with regard to the question of local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in
question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions
appearing in the record.
Id at 193.
3 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
4 In general, the federal court abstains from deciding the case but retains jurisdiction.
The parties then seek a declaratory judgment from the state courts on the state law issues. See
C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 306 (4th ed. 1983). Dismissal without
prejudice may be ordered where retention of jurisdiction would interfere with obtaining a
state court decision. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975).
5 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 52, at 304.
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First, it advances the vital policy of judicial review that dictates
against unnecessary resolution of federal constitutional issues.6 Sec-
ond, since the federal courts defer to state courts on questions of state
law, the Pullman doctrine promotes federalism. 7 Nevertheless, Pull-
man abstention does exact a price. Abstention inevitably leads to
long delays and substantial increases in litigation costs.8 Moreover,
the delay which results from an abstention order can often operate to
deny a plaintiff his constitutional rights.9 And if these rights rise to
the level of "fundamental rights," the possibility of "denial through
delay" becomes critically threatening to the litigant. 10
To prevent this delay, twenty-four states and Puerto Rico have
1
6 Id. § 52, at 306. The policy that constitutional issues should not be decided unnecessa-
rily draws support from Chief Justice Marshall's concept of judicial review as being a reluc-
tant power exercised only because the Court must decide cases brought before it in
conformity with the Constitution. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803). There are also more pragmatic considerations for this policy of self-restraint. Judicial
review is inconsistent with pure majority rule, and conflicts between the judiciary and the
democratic system may result in popular disapproval of court action. The policy of strict
necessity in disposing of constitutional issues is a useful device that helps assure that judicial
review does not take place gratuitously. For an excellent discussion of this policy, see J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 93-94 (2d ed. 1983). See also Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
7 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 305.
8 Professors Lillich and Mundy note that when a federal court abstains, the litigants
bring a separate action, often for declaratory judgment, in the appropriate state court-nor-
mally the state court of general jurisdiction. In effect, the case is transferred from a federal to
a state trial court where the state law questions (and possibly, in a pendent jurisdiction case,
the federal contentions) are presented. Since the ultimate purpose of abstention is to secure
an authoritative determination of state law, the litigants must then proceed to the final appel-
late court through the required tiers of the state judiciary, unless that court has original juris-
diction over the particular case. Thus, the litigants are subject to the cost and delay of a
separate suit in the state court system. This delay may be magnified if the propriety of ab-
stention was litigated in the federal system prior to the separate state action. The delay is also
increased when the case returns to the federal district court for final adjudication subject to
further federal appellate review. Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certfiation of Doubtful State
Law Questions, 18 UCLA L. REV. 888, 890 n.22 (1971). In a number of cases abstention has
led to delays of many years before the case was finally decided on its merits. See, e.g., England
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 U.S. 885 (1966) (six years); Spector Motor
Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (seven years), noted in C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 52,
at 305. Other cases have limped to an inconclusive end, see, e.g., United States v. Leiter
Minerals, Inc., 381 U.S. 413 (1965)(case dismissed as moot eight years after abstention
ordered).
9 Many courts have expressed concern that in some cases the delay caused by abstention
may effectively deny plaintiffs their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 252 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); Badham v. United
States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 721 F.2d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1983).
10 The Supreme Court has demonstrated a reluctance to order abstention in cases involv-
ing certain civil rights claims, such as voting rights, Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537
(1965), racial equality, Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1964) and first
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enacted certification statutesII which permit federal courts, in certain
circumstances, to certify doubtful state law questions directly to that
state's highest court. 12 While the certification procedure does not
completely eliminate the delay in deciding a case, the delay is usually
substantially shorter than that incurred after an abstention order. I3
The certification procedure, therefore, provides a means by which a
federal court can protect a plaintiff's fundamental rights without sac-
amendment rights of expression, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); but sree Harrison
v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
Recognizing the tension inherent in the Plman abstention doctrine, the American Law
Institute, in AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 48, 49 (1969), proposed a modification of the doctrine through a new
statute the heart of which would be contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1371(c):
A district court may stay an action, otherwise properly commenced in or re-
moved to a district court under this title, on the ground that the action presents
issues of State law that ought to be determined in a State proceeding, if the court
finds: (1) that the issues of State law cannot be satisfactorily determined in the light
of the State authorities; and (2) that abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion is warranted either by the likelihood that the necessity for deciding a substan-
tial question of federal constitutional law may thereby be avoided, or by a serious
danger of embarrassing the effectuation of State policies by a decision of State law
at variance with the view that may be ultimately taken by the State court, or by
other circumstances of like character; and (3) that a plain, speedy, and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State; and (4) that the parties' claims of
federal right, if any, including any issues of fact material thereto, can be adequately
protected by review of the State court decision by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
Subdivision (d) provides that the district court shall retain jurisdiction pending a prompt
determination on the merits in the state court, after which federal review shall be restricted to
review in the Supreme Court. Consistent with the Institute's view that fundamental rights
deserve the highest protection, subdivision (g) provides that there will be no abstention in
actions claiming discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national orgin.
11 Some states have adopted the certification process by court rule rather than by statute.
For the sake of brevity, this note will use the term "certification statute" to mean certification
statute or court rule.
12 The following jurisdictions have adopted a certification procedure by statute or court
rule: Alabama, ALA. R. APP. P. 18; Colorado, COLO. App. R. 21.1; Florida, FLA. APp. R.
4.61; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4536 (1981); Hawaii, HAWAII SUP. CT. R. 20; Indiana,
IND. App. R. 15 (o); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 684A. 1-684A. 11 (West Supp. 1983); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3201-60-3212 (1983); Kentucky, Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.37; Louisiana, LA.
Sup. CT. R. 12; Maine, ME. R. Civ. P. 76B; Maryland, MD. CTs. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§§ 12-601-12-609 (1984); Massachusetts, MASS. R. SuP. JUD. CT. 1:03; Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 480.061 (West Supp. 1984); Mississippi, Miss. R. Sup. Or. 46; Montana,
MONT. SuP. CT. R. 6; New Hampshire, N.H. APP. R. 21; North Dakota, N.D. R. App. P. 47;
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1613 (West Supp. 1983); Puerto Rico, P.R.
Sup. CT. R. 27; Rhode Island, R.I. SuP. CT. R. 6; Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2.60.010-2.60.900 (West Supp. 1984); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 51-1A-1-51-lA-12
(1981); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 821.01-821.12 (West Supp. 1983); Wyoming, WYO. R.
App. P. 11.01-11.07.
13 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 908.
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rificing the important demands of federalism or the strong policy of
judicial review which cautions against premature constitutional
adjudications. 14
However, before the certification procedure can be a truly effec-
tive solution to the problem of delay in fundamental rights cases,
more states must not only adopt, but streamline certification so that
certified questions in fundamental rights cases receive priority in the
state courts. Giving priority to fundamental rights cases would fur-
ther reduce the delay, which, given the importance of the rights as-
serted, demand that the delay be held to an absolute minimum.
Part I of this note explores the development of the Pullman ab-
stention doctrine and discusses the policies underlying the doctrine,
including the factors which the federal courts have required to justify
its application. Part II analyzes current certification procedures, em-
phasizing their ability to reduce delay in cases involving important
civil rights. Part III discusses some of the problems associated with
the certification process, suggests statutory language which can pre-
vent these problems, and urges universal adoption of certification
procedures.
I. The Pullman Abstention Doctrine
A federal court faced with doubtful questions of state law in a
federal constitutional case may abstain from the exercise of its juris-
diction to permit state court adjudication of the state law claims.
This abstention permits an authoritative determination of state law,
promotes federalism, and prevents premature constitutional deci-
sions. 15 At the same time, however, this abstention policy often ex-
acts a high price from litigants-delay and additional cost.16
The concept of federal court abstention stems from the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman
Co. 17 In Pullman, the Supreme Court set forth the principle that,
when controlling state law was uncertain, the federal court may hold
the case in abeyance, retain jurisdiction, and direct the parties to
proceed through state courts to a decision on the state issues.' 8
14 See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976); notes 76-91 infa and accompanying
text.
15 See notes 4-5 supra.
16 See note 8 supra.
17 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
18 Id at 501-02. For an extensive analysis of the Pullman abstention doctrine, see Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
1071 (1974).
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In Pullman, railroad porters' 9 challenged an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission requiring that all sleeping cars operated by
railroads in Texas be in the charge of a Pullman conductor. Prior to
the Commission's order, trains with only one sleeping car had been in
the charge of a porter instead of a conductor. Porters were black,
conductors white. The porters attacked the order on the grounds
that it violated Texas law, and the commerce, due process, and equal
protection clauses20 of the federal Constitution. The Texas statute
empowering the Commission with railroad supervision made it "the
duty of the said Commission. . . to correct abuses and prevent un-
just discrimination in the rates, charges and tolls of such railroads
• . . and to prevent any and all other abuses in the conduct of their
business .... "21 A three-judge district court held that the statute
did not authorize the Commission to issue the order as the correction
of an "abuse."' 22 Accordingly, the court enjoined enforcement of the
Commission's order on that ground.23
On direct review, the Supreme Court held that the district court
should have abstained from deciding the case. The Texas law, ac-
cording to the Court, was "far from clear."124 In the Court's assess-
ment, the statute's language did not permit a confident
determination of whether the Commission's order was within its pur-
view since the statute provided little guidance concerning the limits
of the Commission's power to correct "abuses. ' 25 Moreover, Texas
decisions interpreting the statutory language did not clarify the issue.
The Court reasoned that a federal court that routinely decided state
law issues ran a high risk of deciding those questions erroneously. 26
The potential for error was clear. If the federal district court in Pull-
man erroneously held that the Railroad Commission's order was au-
thorized, it would needlessly reach the federal constitutional
questions.2 7 If the federal court erroneously held that the order was
not authorized by the statute, it would avoid for the moment decid-
19 The original complainants were the Pullman Company and affected railroads. The
porters intervened as complainants. 312 U.S. at 498.
20 The fourteenth amendment challenges were that the order was unjust and arbitrary
and that it discriminated against blacks.
21 312 U.S. at 499 n.i.
22 Id at 499.
23 Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex. 1940).
24 312 U.S. at 499.
25 Id
26 Ad
27 If the court then held the order constitutional, the ultimate disposition of the contro-
versy would also be erroneous.
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ing the constitutional questions, but only at the risk of improvidently
enjoining an ostensibly valid state program. Moreover, if the state
courts subsequently exposed the error by deciding the state question
differently, the federal decision may be reopened, 28 possibly leading
to litigation of the federal constitutional questions. Based on these
considerations, the Supreme Court concluded in Pullman that only by
staying the federal action and directing the parties to the state judi-
cial system could a federal court "avoid [both] the waste of a tenta-
tive decision [and] . . . the friction of a premature constitutional
adjudication. '29
In addition to promoting federalism and avoiding premature
constitutional rulings, the abstention doctrine also gives procedural
meaning to the doctrine formulated in En'e Railroad v. Tompkins, 30
which requires federal courts to use applicable state law, including
state decisional law, in deciding substantive state law issues.3 1 When
the federal court abstains, the federal action is stayed. This gives the
litigants an opportunity to proceed in the state court to secure a de-
claratory judgment of the state law issue. 32
Pullman abstention by a federal court is not absolute but de-
28 See, e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177
(1933).
29 312 U.S. at 500.
30 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
31 Id at 78; see Roth, Certifed Questionsfom the Federal Courts.: Review and Re-Proposal, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 5 (1979).
32 Since retention of jurisdiction is usually ordered in Pullman-type cases, the Supreme
Court has defended abstention on the grounds that abstention "does not, of course, involve
the abdication of federal jurisdiction but only the postponement of its exercise." Harrison v.
NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 175 (1959). Professor Wright notes that the implementation of this
has led to a complicated procedure. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 52, at 306-07. The Court
first required that the federal constitutional objections be presented to the state court so that
it may consider the issues of state law in light of the constitutional claims. Government and
Civic Employees Org. Comm., CIO v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364, 366 (1957). The problem was
that if the state court should decide the federal issues, on ordinary principles of res judicata,
this would be a binding determination subject to review only in the Supreme Court, and
there would be nothing left for the federal court to decide in the exercise of the jurisdiction it
had retained. Since the Supreme Court cannot hear most cases tendered it, this would mean
that many litigants would never have a hearing in a federal court even though they were
asserting claims based on federal law. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examin-
ers, 375 U.S. 411,416 (1964), the Supreme Court observed that the possibility of review in the
Supreme Court is an inadequate substitute for a district court adjudication to which the
litigant has a statutory right. The Court then announced the new rule that although a liti-
gant may submit all aspects of the case for a binding adjudication by the state court, he is not
required to do so. Any party may make, on the state record, a reservation to the disposition of
the entire case by the state courts, by informing them that that he is exposing his federal
contentions only as a matter of information, and that he intends to return to the federal court
for disposition of the federal contentions. Id at 421-22.
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pends on the facts of the particular case.3 3 Historically, abstention
has always been the exception and never the rule.3 4 Moreover, ab-
stention is discretionary with the court.3 5 Although the facts of a
given case may justify abstention, the federal court need not abstain
if in its judgment applying the doctrine would cause delay and ex-
pense out of proportion to any interests which might be served by
invoking abstention.3 6 The federal courts have identified three fac-
tors which together justify Pullman-type abstention: (1) the com-
plaint touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal
courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is
open; (2) such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a
definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy;
and (3) the possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful.37
In addition to these three requirements, the federal *courts have
recently begun to develop a fourth requirement which would apply
in voting rights cases and perhaps in cases involving other fundamen-
tal rights. In Badham v. United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California,38 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that "abstention orders in cases involving voting rights require spe-
cial consideration. ' 39 The Badham plaintiffs, registered voters in sev-
eral congressional districts in California, challenged a California
congressional redistricting bill on several state and federal constitu-
tional grounds.4° A three-judge district court had abstained from de-
ciding the case after determining that the case met the three-pronged
test required for Pullman abstention.
First, the district court in Badham held that the case touched on
a sensitive issue of social policy because reapportionment is an area
in which state courts are encouraged to require and formulate valid
plans.41 Second, the court determined that federal constitutional ad-
judication could be avoided or altered by a definitive ruling on the
33 See, e.g., Badham v. United States Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 721 F.2d 1170,
1174 (9th Cir. 1983).
34 In Meridith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943), the Supreme Court held that
mere difficulty in determining the state law was not a sufficient justification for abstention.
35 See Badham, 721 F.2d at 1174.
36 Id
37 See, e.g. ,id at 1172; C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377 (9th
Cir. 1983); Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974).
38 721 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. 1983).
39 Id at 1172.
40 Id at 1171.
41 Id at 1176-77.
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state constitutional claim.42 The redistricting bill had been subjected
to substantial changes which, if valid, would make the plan more
cognizable under the federal Constitution. The plaintiffs had also
challenged these "changes" as violations of the state constitution be-
cause they were implemented by the Secretary of State rather than
the state legislature. The district court held that a decision on this
state law issue would determine whether it would review the reap-
portionment plan with or without the challenged changes.43 This
could avoid or alter the federal constitutional issue because with the
changes the plan had a population deviation percentage below that
which the Supreme Court had found constitutional. 44 However,
without the changes the plan had a population deviation which came
closer to deviations found violative of the federal Constitution.45
Finally, the district court held that the case satisfied the third
prong of Pullman, doubtfulness of the state law issues.46 The Supreme
Court had said that a state law issue is doubtful if it is "susceptible"
to an interpretation that would avoid or modify the federal constitu-
tional question.4 7 According to the district court, the state law in
Badham was susceptible to such an interpretation. The court stated:
The legality of the Secretary of State's implementation of the
changed reapportionment bill is an issue of first impression in
California. No California case law or state statute provides a
clear answer. . . .Since Elections Code § 3000 may be "suscepti-
ble" of an interpretation that would modify the federal constitu-
tional question, the third prong of the Pullman test is satisfied. 4
Having determined that the three-pronged test of Pullman had been
satisfied, the district court abstained, retaining jurisdiction to resolve
whatever federal issues remained after the state court's
adjudications. 49
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's abstention or-
der.50 The court of appeals, however, alluded to a fourth require-
ment in the Pullman test that ought to apply in voting rights cases:
42 Id at 1177.
43 Id
44 Id
45 Id
46 Id. at 1177-79.
47 Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132,
146-47 (1976).
48 721 F.2d at 1178-79. The district court opinion is unreported except as an appendix to
the circuit court opinion. Thus, cites to the district court opinion will be cites to 721 F.2d.
49 Id. at 1179.
50 Id. at 1171.
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independent consideration of the effect the abstention order delay
would have on the plaintiffs' voting rights. 5' Because the district
court had held that the plaintiffs could return to the federal court if
they were unable to obtain a sufficiently swift adjudication of state
claims in the state courts, the court of appeals affirmed.52
Significantly, the court of appeals addressed the "delay factor"
requirement at some length. The court rejected the plaintiffs' con-
tention that Pullman abstention may never be applied in voting rights
cases, noting that "there is no per se civil rights exception to the ab-
stention doctrine. ' 53 The court, however, expressed its concern re-
garding the special dangers inherent in applying abstention in voting
rights cases, noting that delay in voting rights cases is "particularly
insidious. ' 54 Other courts, including the Supreme Court, have said
that the dangers posed by an abstention order are particularly evi-
dent in voting rights cases.55 The Badham court, however, goes be-
yond mere concern in fashioning a solution which arguably adds a
fourth prong to the traditional three-pronged test for Pullman
abstention:
The fundamental importance of the right to vote and the
special dangers posed to that right by delay require a different
approach to abstention orders in voting rights cases. We need
not decide whether this different approach is in essence a sepa-
rate requirement or merely a background against which to apply
the traditional three-part test. We do hold that before abstaining
in voting cases a district court must independently consider the
effect that delay resulting from the abstention order will have on
the plaintiff's right to vote. Although we are mindful of the im-
portant principles of federalism implicit in the doctrine of absten-
tion, these principles may be outweighed in an individual case by
51 Id at 1173.
52 Id at 1174.
53 Id at 1172 (quoting C-Y Development, 703 F.2d at 381); accord Duncan v. Poythress,
657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) ("An alleged denial of voting rights does not, in itself,
constitute a 'special circumstance' which automatically precludes federal court abstention."),
cert. granted, 455 U.S. 937, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 368 (1982).
54 Id at 1173. This is because, as the court explained, in a redistricting case the court's
failure to act before the next election forces voters to vote in an election which may be consti-
tutionally defective. Although a subsequent court may strike down the apportionment plan,
there is no procedure for removing from office the officials elected under the defective plan.
Moreover, these officials may acquire advantages of incumbency that may be difficult for
their opponents to overcome in future elections held under a constitutionally valid plan. Id
55 See Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (The right to vote is fundamental because it preserves all rights.)); Wes-
berry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (Even the most basic rights are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined.).
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the countervailing interest in ensuring each citizen's federal right
to vote.
56
Although the Badham court limits the application of the "addi-
tional prong" to voting rights cases, the court's reasoning would seem
to apply with equal force to cases involving other "fundamental
rights" such as free speech and freedom from racial discrimination.
Extending this reasoning into the arena of all fundamental rights
would indeed make the Pullman test four-pronged. Furthermore,
since abstention orders often involve lengthy delays, many courts in
fundamental rights cases would either refuse to abstain or fashion a
remedy which could, in effect, produce the same result. The Badham
case illustrates this problem. The district court in Badham recognized
that the delay inherent in the abstention order alone could restrict
the plaintiff's voting rights.5 7 At this point, the court had two
choices. The court could refuse to abstain, thereby sacrificing the
interests of federalism, including the policy against premature consti-
tutional adjudications, in order to preserve the plaintiffs' voting
rights. Alternatively, the court could abstain from deciding the case,
pending a sufficiently swift adjudication of the state claim in the
state courts, the course chosen by the district court in Badham. If the
court exercised the latter option, and the state adjudications were not
swift, the result would be the same as if the court had refused to
abstain in the first instance. The court would sacrifice federalism in
favor of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thus, either choice ulti-
mately risks a federal adjudication of the doubtful state law issues.
In sum, if a federal court in its Pullman analysis independently
considers the effect of delay on the plaintiff's constitutional rights, it
engages in a balancing test-weighing the interests to be promoted
by abstention, federalism and avoidance of premature constitutional
adjudications, against the interest to be served by reaching the case's
merits, preservation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Ulti-
mately, under traditional abstention doctrine, the court must choose
to promote one interest and to sacrifice the other. The delay inher-
ent in the abstention order forces the court to make this choice; certi-
fication procedures can reduce that delay and thus limit the extent of
the necessary sacrifice.
56 721 F.2d at 1173.
57 Id. at 1174.
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II. Certification of Doubtful Questions of State Law: Reducing
the Delay
Strong policy concerns underlie the Pullman abstention doctrine.
The doctrine, however, invariably causes delay-delay which can ef-
fectively deny a plaintiff his constitutional rights.58  When these
rights are fundamental rights, the decision whether or not to abstain
is crucial.59 Federal courts could avoid this difficult decision and at
the same time reduce delay by using a certification procedure, rather
than abstention, for resolution of the uncertain state law questions.
The delay could be further reduced if the certification statutes re-
quired that state courts give priority on their dockets to certified
questions in fundamental rights cases. 60
A. The Process of Cerifiation
Certification to state high courts of doubtful state law questions
is a relatively recent development. Until 1965, only Florida had an
established certification procedure, and that had been used only oc-
casionally.6' Today, twenty-four states and Puerto Rico have certifi-
cation procedures. 62 Certification statutes vary among the states.
The majority of those states with certification statutes permit certifi-
cation by the federal trial and appellate courts; other states authorize
certification only by the courts of appeal and the Supreme Court.63
Most states require that the certified question be such that it could be
determinative of the case. 64 Some states, however, require that the
certified question must be determinative of the case.65 All states re-
58 See note 9 supra.
59 See note 10 supra.
60 Whether certified questions are to be given docket priority in state courts is a question
not covered in the statutes or rules. Professors Lillich and Mundy indicate that the problem
is less acute in smaller states where there is no large backlog of cases. However, the situation
would be quite different in states with large caseloads, like New York and California. As
Professors Lillich and Mundy observe, unless priority is given in jurisdictions with large
caseloads, the desired effect of minimizing delay in the certification process will be impaired.
Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 909.
61 See id at 888.
62 See note 12 supra.
63 The apparent reason for restricting the certification process to the appellate courts is to
limit the total number of certificates. Nevertheless, requiring litigants to proceed to the ap-
pellate courts before seeking certification hinders the certification process from achieving a
satisfactory reduction in delay.
64 This language is necessary to prevent the state court's answer to the certified question
from being merely an advisory opinion. See notes 97-104 infia and accompanying text.
65 This language is too restrictive. In complex litigation, it may be impossible to deter-
mine whether the question is in fact determinative of the case.
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quire that the certifying court be satisfied that no controlling prece-
dent exists in the decisions of the receiving state's highest court or
intermediate appellate courts.66
The American Law Institute has approved the certification
technique,67 and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
adopted a Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. 68 Profes-
sor Moore has noted that "[t]he advantages of certification. . .[over
66 This language, in effect, states the prerequisite for federal court abstention in the first
instance. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
67 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 888.
68 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 106-07 (1967).
UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT
SECTION 1. Power to Answer. The [Supreme Court] may answer questions of law
certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a Court of Appeals of the
United States, a United States District Court [or the highest appellate court or the
intermediate appellate court of any other state], when requested by the certifying
court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state
which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as
to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the
decisions of the [Supreme Court] [and intermediate appellate courts] of this state.
SECTION 2. Method ofInvoking. This Act may be invoked by an order of any of the
courts referred to in section 1 upon the court's own motion or upon the motion of
any party to the cause.
SECTION 3. Contents of the Ceriftation Order. A certification order shall set forth (1)
the questions of law to be answered; and (2) a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified and showing fully the nature of the controversy in which the
questions arose.
SECTION 4. Preparation of the Certifieation Order. The certification order shall be pre-
pared by the certifying court, signed by the judge presiding at the hearing, and
forwarded to the [Supreme Court] by the clerk of the certifying court under its
official seal. The [Supreme Court] may require the original or copies of all or of any
portion of the record before the certifying court to be filed with the certification
order, if, in the opinion of the [Supreme Court], the record or portion thereof may
be necessary in answering the question.
SECTION 5. Costs of Certifcation. Fees and costs shall be the same as in [civil appeals]
docketed before the [Supreme Court] and shall be equally divided between the par-
ties unless otherwise ordered by the certifying court in its order of certification.
SECTION 6. Briefs and Argument. Proceedings in the [Supreme Court] shall be those
provided in [local rules or statutes governing briefs and arguments].
SECTION 7. Opinion. The written opinion of the [Supreme Court] stating the law
governing the questions certified shall be sent by the clerk under the seal of the
Supreme Court of the certifying court and to the parties.
SECTION 8. Power to Certify. The [Supreme Court] [or the intermediate appellate
courts] of this state, on [its] [their] own motion or the motion of any party, may
order certification of questions of law to the highest court of any state when it ap-
pears to the certifying court that there are involved in any proceeding before the
court questions of law of the receiving state which may be determinative of the
cause then pending in the certifying court and it appears to the certifying court that
there are no controlling precedents in the decisions of the highest court or intermedi-
ate appellate courts of the receiving state.
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abstention] . . . are obvious: the litigants save time and money and
judicial resources, both state and federal, are conserved." 69
The Supreme Court approved the procedure in 1960 in Clay v.
Sun Insurance Ojfe, Ltd ,70 where the Court instructed the court of
appeals to avail itself of Florida's certification procedure. 7' The
court of appeals had previously decided a federal constitutional ques-
tion but failed to decide two nonconstitutional points of Florida law
which alone could have resolved the case. 72 In remanding the case,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote favorably of the certification process:
[A]s the Court of Appeals indicated, it could not, on the available
materials, make a confident guess how the Florida Supreme
Court would construe the statute. The Florida Legislature, with
rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of authoritatively de-
termining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a
statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful
question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its
decision. 73
Since Clay, the Supreme Court and the federal courts have employed
the available certification procedures. 74 The courts have based their
approval of the certification procedures on the relatively shorter de-
SECTION 9. Procedure on Cert,;ing. The procedures for certification from this state to
the receiving state shall be those provided in the laws of the receiving state.
SECTION 10. Severabiliy. If any provision of this Act or the application thereof to
any person, court, or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect
other provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are
severable.
SECTION 11. Construction. This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
SECTION 12. Short Title. This Act may be cited as the Uniform Certification of
Questions of Law Act.
SECTION 13. Tine of Taking Effect. This Act shall take effect...
69 1AJ. MOORE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL &J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
0.203[5], at 2145 (2d ed. 1982).
70 363 U.S. 207 (1960).
71 Id at 212.
72 Id at 209-10.
73 Id at 212.
74 E.g., Zant v. Stephens 456 U.S. 410 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976);
Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963);
Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963); Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 430
F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1970); Gaston v. Pittman, 413 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1969); Martinez v.
Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1969), rev'don other grounds, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
394 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1968); Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Shifflet, 380 F.2d 375 (5th Cir. 1967);
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963); Sun Ins. Office v. Clay, 319
F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1963).
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lay encountered as compared with the longer delay commonly result-
ing from use of the traditional abstention order.75
B. The Bellotti Decision.: Certification and Fundamental Rights-the
Importance of Reducing Delay
In Bellotti v. Baird,76 the Supreme Court considered an appeal
from a three-judge district court decision holding a Massachusetts
abortion statute unconstitutional. 77 The Court found Pullman ab-
stention applicable but directed the district court to certify the con-
trolling question of statutory interpretation to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts pursuant to Massachusetts' certification stat-
ute.78 Significantly, the Court's decision of whether to decide the
merits of the appeal or to order abstention was influenced by the fact
that the delay resulting from abstention would be reduced by the use
of Massachusetts' certification procedure. 79 Indeed, the Court im-
plied that but for the availability of the certification procedure, it
would have reached the merits of the constitutional issue.80 The Bel-
lotti opinion encourages the district courts to utilize certification to
reduce the traditional sacrifices associated with Pullman abstention.8'
The statute questioned in Bellotti governed the type of consent,
including parental consent, required before an abortion could be per-
formed on an unmarried woman under the age of eighteen.8 2 The
appellees brought a class action suit challenging the statute as a vio-
lation of the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protec-
tion clauses. The state courts had not yet construed the statute. The
district court held the statute unconstitutional because it created a
''parental veto" over the performance of abortions on minor children
even when a minor was capable of giving informed consent.83 The
court permanently enjoined the statute's operation. 4 By implica-
tion, the court denied the appellant's motion that the court abstain
from deciding the issue pending an authoritative construction of the
statute by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.8 5 The
75 See, e.g. , Be/lold, 428 U.S. at 150.
76 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
77 Id at 140-43.
78 Id. at 151.
79 Id at 150-51.
80 Id at 151.
81 1A J. MOORE, supra note 69, at 2145-46.
82 428 U.S. at 134-35.
83 Id at 140.
84 Id at 133.
85 Id at 134.
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Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for cer-
tification of the state law questions. 86
The Supreme Court reasoned that the Massachusetts statute
could be interpreted as simply preferring parental consultation and
consent while simultaneously allowing a minor capable of giving in-
formed consent to obtain a court ordered abortion without parental
consent.87 The Court said that the statute thus read would be funda-
mentally different from a statute which created a "parental veto."88
Therefore, the constitutional issue would be presented in a substan-
tially different posture. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that
the district court should have abstained from deciding the constitu-
tional issue and should have certified the statutory ambiguities to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 89 In ordering certification,
the Court expressed concern that abstention order delay may in ef-
fect deprive a plaintiff of her constitutional rights.90 The Court em-
phasized the role certification could play in easing the burden of a
difficult balancing test between competing equities:
This Court often has remarked that the equitable practice of ab-
stention is limited by considerations of the delay and expense to
which application of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise.
As we have also noted, however, the availability of an adequate
certification procedure does, of course, in the long run save time,
energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism.
The importance of speed in resolution of the instant litiga-
tion is manifest. Each day the statute is in effect, irretrievable
events, with substantial personal consequences, occur. Although
we do not mean to intimate that abstention would be improper
in this case were certification not possible, the availability of cer-
tification greatly simplifies the analysis. . . .Insofar as the issue
thus ceases to become one of total denial of access and becomes
one rather of relative burden, the cost of abstention is reduced
and the desirability of that equitable remedy accordingly
increased.9 1
Taken together, Bellotti and Badham illustrate the necessity of
certification. The Belotti Court, like the court in Badham, had to en-
gage in a difficult balancing test-weighing the interests involved in
abstention, federalism and avoidance of a premature constitutional
86 Id
87 Id at 145.
88 Id
89 Id at 151.
90 id
91 Id at 150-51.
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ruling, against the interest involved in deciding the case's merits,
preservation of the plaintiffs' civil rights. As the Be/lotti Court indi-
cated, however, its analysis was greatly simplified by the availability
of the certification procedure. The reduction of delay engendered by
certification allowed the Court to order abstention (certification is
essentially a form of abstention) without seriously jeopardizing the
plaintiffs' rights. The Badlham court, on the other hand, had no re-
course to a certification procedure. Accordingly, the Badham court
had to engage in a difficult balancing test and ultimately choose to
promote one interest while sacrificing the other.
III. Drafting the Certification Statute
Despite the appeal of the certification process as a solution to the
delay involved in Pullman abstention, certain difficulties are associ-
ated with its use. Careful drafting of the certification statute can,
however, obviate these difficulties and produce a workable certifica-
tion process which allows the federal courts to protect the policies
underlying Pullman and, at the same time, preserve the litigant's con-
stitutional rights.
A. The Problem of Abstractness
One difficulty with the certification process, which has been
noted by some commentators, is that the questions certified are too
abstract for judicial resolution. In essence, the criticism is that
through the certification process state courts are presented with ques-
tions of law devoid of a concrete factual setting.92
The problem of abstractness, which stems from the "case or con-
troversy" doctrine,93 can be resolved by careful drafting of the certifi-
cation statute. The language of the statute should make clear that
92 See, for example, Kaplan, Certifcation of Questions from Federal Appellate Courts to the Flor-
ida Supreme Court andIts Impact on the Abstention Doctrine, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 413, 431 (1962),
where the author states that questions certified by federal courts would compel the state
courts to give an "academic answer . . . which is void of any factual surroundings." This
objection has not proved to be a serious problem in actual practice. See Lillich & Mundy,
supra note 8, at 900; Note, Interjurisdictional Certifcation." Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative
Judicial Federalism, I1I U. PA. L. REV. 344, 351 n.54 (1963). All certification procedures pres-
ently in effect require that, at a minimum, the certified question be accompanied by a state-
ment of facts. New Hampshire, for example, requires "a statement of all facts relevant to the
questions certified." N.H. APP. R. 21. Hawaii merely requires "a statement of facts showing
the nature of the cause." HAwAIt SUP. CT. R. 20.
93 Courts traditionally have refused to give opinions which would only be of academic or
hypothetical interest, construing the "case or controversy" requirement to mean actual as
opposed to potential disputes. See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 901 n.86.
[1984]
[Vol. 59:1339]
the state court will not answer certified questions unless they are
based on findings of fact by the certifying court.94 Restricting certifi-
cation to such situations should generate no more abstract questions
than cases appealed from lower state courts. Certainly, no one would
contend that ordinary appeals from inferior courts present abstract
questions of law.95 The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act ("Uniform Act") requires that the certification order set forth "a
statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and showing
fully the nature of the controversy in which the question arose."'96
This language effectively prevents the certification process from gen-
erating abstract questions, thus obviating the problem of abstractness
in the certification process.
B. The Problem of Advisory Opinions
The problem of advisory opinions, like the problem of abstract-
ness, is a facet of the "case or controversy" doctrine. Courts refuse to
render advisory opinions because such opinions would be based upon
hypothetical situations rather than concrete disputes between ad-
verse parties. Furthermore, very few states have provisions allowing
their courts to grant advisory opinions.97 Therefore, the question
arises whether the certification process, in effect, requires the state
court to render an advisory opinion.9 8 As Professors Lillich and
Mundy note, the primary confusion stems from the failure of the
drafters to indicate in the certification statutes whether the respective
state courts have jurisdiction over the parties in certified question
cases.99 In In re Elliot,100 the Supreme Court of Washington found it
implicit in the court's having jurisdiction over the question that it
had jurisdiction over the parties. The court thus held that it was not
merely giving advice to the federal court. 10 1 Moreover, the court
held that its opinion would be binding upon the parties as res judi-
cata in the state courts and would constitute a binding state
94 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 902 n.93. The authors note that with an existing
certification statute this result could be achieved simply by replacing "statement of facts"
with "findings of fact" in the statute or rule. Id
95 Id at 902.
96 UNIFORM CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3 (1967); see note 68 supra.
97 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 902-03.
98 Several decisions specifically discussing the problem under certification statutes have
found such opinions not to be advisory. See, e.g., In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347
(1968); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966).
99 Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 904.
100 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 (1968).
101 Id at 610, 446 P.2d at 354.
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precedent. 0 2
A typical certification statute provides for filing of briefs and
presentation of oral argument in the receiving state court. The ques-
tion presented to the state court will thus be framed in a concrete
factual setting and the proceeding will be adversary. Accordingly, it
is reasonable to read into the certification statute the provision that
the parties will be bound under the normal rules of stare decisis and
res judicata10 3 However, to avoid confusion, the statute should ex-
pressly state that the state court has jurisdiction over the parties for
the purposes of the certified question. Moreover, the statute should
make clear that the parties will be bound by the determination of the
state court. 10 4 This should dispel the concern that state court judg-
ments in certification cases are merely advisory opinions.
C. The Problem of What Effect the Federal Court Should Accord the State
Court Judgment
Related to the advisory opinion problem is the problem of what
weight the federal court will accord the state court opinion. 0 5 The
problem arises because the certification statute is state law and state
law cannot bind a federal court. Thus, although state legislatures
may authorize their highest courts to answer certified questions, the
weight to be accorded these determinations remains solely a question
102 Id at 610-11, 446 P.2d at 354. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine also reached this
conclusion despite the fact that in other cases the Maine legislature had expressly authorized
advisory opinions. See In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832-33 (Me. 1966).
103 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 904-05. The authors note that there is a residual
philosophical difficulty which cannot be eliminated by drafting. Use of the certification pro-
cedure results in part of a single controversy being resolved in federal court and part in state
court. Thus, it might be argued that the party electing to have his case determined in a
federal forum is being denied, at least partially, the right implicit in the choice of the forum.
The short answer to this objection is that the party selects the federal forum subject to the
possibility that the court may abstain from deciding some issue.
104 The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act ("Uniform Act") does not provide
for giving the state court jurisdiction over the parties nor does it suggest what weight ought to
be accorded the state court determination. See note 68 supra. Professors Lillich and Mundy
recommend the following addition to § 7 of the Uniform Act: "The answer to the certified
question shall be accorded the same determination and precedential force as any other appel-
late decision of the Supreme Court of this state." Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 914.
105 Some state judges fear that the federal court may ignore the state court judgment. In
re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 638, 446 P.2d 347, 370 (1968) (Hale, J., dissenting). Otherjudges
rely on the force of Ene to implement the decision. In re Elliot, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 446 P.2d 347
(1968); In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827 (Me. 1966). See also Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at
907, where the authors note that reliance on Erie seems sufficient in diversity cases because the
opinion by the state court would constitute an authoritative statement of the rule of law in
that state and the federal court would be bound to follow it. But see United Serv. Life Ins. Co.
v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 860 ('Tex. 1965).
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of federal law. However, the federal statute 0 6 implementing the full
faith and credit clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to
give state court proceedings the same full faith and credit that those
proceedings enjoy in the courts of the rendering state. 0 7 This statute
should apply in the certification context.
In a recent decision, fz'gra v. Warren City School District Board of
Education ,10" the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vitality of the federal
full faith and credit statute, holding that in the absence of federal
law modifying the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the preclusive ef-
fect in federal court of a state court judgment is determined by that
state's law.'0 9 In short, a judgment that is res judicata in the jurisdic-
tion that rendered it is res judicata in all courts, state and federal."10
Thus, since certification procedures provide that the parties are
bound by the state court's determination of the certified question,"'
ordinary rules of res judicata should apply and the federal court will
be compelled to treat the judgment as it would any other state court
judgment under full faith and credit. The federal court, therefore,
could not disregard the state court's answer to the certified question.
D. The Problem of Delay in the Certfication Process Itself
Finally, in enacting a certification statute, the drafters should
recognize that the certification process does not completely eliminate
delay. Indeed, burgeoning caseloads in the state courts have pro-
106 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). This statute provides that state judicial proceedings shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States as they have in the
courts of the state from which they are taken.
107 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
108 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
109 Id at 896. The Court went on to reject the petitioner's argument that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1976 Supp. V) prevents state court judgments from creating a claim preclusive bar.
104 S. Ct. at 898.
110 To the effect that a state court judgment is to be accorded full faith and credit in the
federal courts, see Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980) (rejecting the view that state court judgments have no issue preclusive
effect in § 1983 suits); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Angel v. Bullington,
330 U.S. 183 (1946).
111 See Note, 45 WASH. L. REv. 167, 174-75 (1970) where the author notes that certifica-
tion is, in many instances, a technique to be used instead of the abstention procedure. In
cases where abstention is ordered, the parties frequently initiate a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in the state court. Clearly, the declaratory judgment itself affects the legal relations of
the parties. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 421 (1964).
If the state court response to a certified question is a substitute for the declaratory judgment
abstention procedure, it is not unreasonable to suggest it is equivalent in legal effect. Thus,
the certification procedures, at least by implication, provide that the parties are bound in a
res judicata sense. The statutes should, however, provide for this explicitly. See notes 103-04
supra and accompanying text.
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duced increasingly lengthy time delays in the certification process." 2
These delays must be minimized if certification is to be a valuable
alternative to the traditional Pullman abstention order.
Although many factors contribute to the length of time a case is
pending,113 congested state court dockets is the most significant fac-
tor. Thus, the delay involved in the certification process could be
substantially reduced if the certification statute provided docket pri-
ority for certified question cases. Not all certified question cases
should receive priority however. This would be unfair to litigants
whose cases have already been docketed. Rather, certified question
cases should receive priority only where delay poses a substantial
threat to the litigant's constitutional rights, that is, for example,
where the case involves important civil rights.
Currently, the Uniform Act does not provide docket priority for
certified questions. Legislative drafters, when adopting the Uniform
Act or some similar statute, should therefore consider adding a provi-
sion which would permit the state court to grant docket priority at
the request of the federal court.' 1 4 In requesting priority, the federal
court should consider the nature of the litigant's rights and the dan-
ger that delay poses to those rights. In the interest of federalism,
however, the certification statute should provide that the final deci-
sion on whether to grant docket priority rests in the sound discretion
of the state court.115
This procedure for determining docket priority should generate
neither a rush of requests for priority by the federal courts nor a
flurry of denials by the state courts. It is reasonable to suppose that
112 See, e.g., Roth, note 31 supra, at 2; Note, Supreme Court-Pressures and Priorities, 53 FLA.
Bj. 268, 269 (1979); Report of the Supreme Court Commission on the Florida Appellate Court Structure,
53 FLA. Bj. 274, 276 (1979); England & McMahon, Quantity Discounts in Appellate Justice, 60
JUD. 442 (1977). As a result, some federal courts have been reluctant to certify questions to
the state courts. See, for example, State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 275-76
(5th Cir. 1976), where the fifth circuit stated that the effect of delay was the determinative
factor in the denial of the certification request. See also Mattis, Certifcation of Questions of State
Law. An Impractical Tool in the Hands of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 717, 725-26
(1969).
113 See Lillich & Mundy, supra note 8, at 908, where the authors list several factors con-
tributing to the length of delay: (1) the number and complexity of the issues involved; (2) the
novelty or difficulty of the questions; (3) the number of procedural tactics employed by coun-
sel; and (4) the crowding of court dockets.
114 This could be done by adding a subsection 3 to § 3 of the Uniform Act. For example,
"SECTION 3. A certification order shall set forth ... (3) any request that the certified ques-
tion receive priority on the docket of the [Supreme Court] and the reasons for such request.
The [Supreme Court] in its discretion may deny any such request."
115 See note 114 supra.
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federal and state court judges are sensitive to the burdens that can be
placed upon either by an injudicious use of the procedure.
IV. Conclusion
A federal court faced with a Pullman-type situation must engage
in a difficult balancing test in determining whether or not to abstain.
The court must weigh the policies underlying Pullman, which militate
in favor of abstention, against the interests in protecting the litigant's
important constitutional rights, which could be lost through the de-
lay inherent in the abstention order. By reducing delay, the certifica-
tion process allows the federal court to avoid this difficult balancing
test in which the federal court must ultimately choose to promote one
interest at the expense of the other. The certification process, how-
ever, is not free of problems. But, careful drafting can obviate most
of these problems and produce a practicable certification statute. Ul-
timately, the workability of certification will depend upon the good
faith and integrity of the federal and state judiciaries, as well as the
ability of the state legislatures to formulate workable certification
statutes.
Theodore B. Eichelberger
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